I hate gangs

Skeptical about Skepticism

Does it Work?

The use of Skepticism as a tool is a prudent decision (or is it?), but Pragmatism's use of 'what works' is a much more viable and productive method in fulfilling the Skeptic's claim to be ever searching for truth.

Mortimer J. Adler, in his classic work How to Read a Book, after laying out the guidelines for effective, in-depth reading, ends the process with critiquing a work. The thing to note is that he states very clearly (on multiple occasions) that one should not pass any judgment whatsoever concerning the author's ideas until the entire book has been devoured and the ideas have been fully understood as the author intended for them to be understood (chapter 10). The concept is, how can you say you agree or disagree with something until you've grasped what that something is? Until the entire work is fully understood and one is able to (Adler would say 'obliged to') state whether one agrees or disagrees, the appropriate thing to do is to suspend judgment (which is also a viable 'critique', after attaining comprehension [chapter 11]). And we have now tapped into the Skeptic’s stance in life.

This permanent marker looks rectangular from one angle and circular from another. So which is it, what is its nature? When I'm sick my food tastes different then when I'm not. What is the nature of the food's taste? Red looks red to me, but what is the nature of 'red'--is it C# to you (Dr. Monast's idea, which is much cooler than saying 'my red or your blue')? None of these questions have a conclusive answer, for the thing judged is dependent on the one doing the judging who can only be a biased judge, that is, as someone within the situation. I can never experience your red, I can't experience something's taste outside of my tasting it when I'm either sick or healthy and I can only ever see the marker from angles within my three-dimensional perspective, with my eyes, in the visible light spectrum.

Concerning intangible things, as an example, an idea that was previously held as corresponding to reality ('the earth is the center of the universe') is now seen to be false; how do we know what we see as having correspondence now will not later? The scale of proof concerning God's existence versus nonexistence is equally balanced--for every point one side makes, the other finds a counter--; can I say God is or isn't real? In Adler's terms, since I don't 'fully understand the idea' of the nature of said things, I am obliged to continue to withhold judgment.

Sextus Empiricus claims to be, as a Skeptic, on the continuing search for truth (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [hereafter OP] 375), and repeats repeatedly (with repetitions) that his interest is the attainment of ataraxia, tranquility of mind, imperturbability of soul (OP 376). His view is that if someone takes a firm stance philosophically, they are bound to fearful running from 'evil' things and desperate clinging on to 'good' things (OP 378). But if it can be shown that we don't actually have the intellectual license to assent (or dissent) to something, that nothing can be said to be inherently 'good' or 'evil', true or false, then we can be at peace with the way things appear to be and what we have (speaking, of course, more broadly then just physical possessions); be at peace with knowing that we don't know (hello, Socrates).

To be skeptical is a wise thing; it would behoove us if we were more skeptical in our lives, not just taking for granted the things we see or are told. Take, for example, the taboo that is the study of philosophy in the Evangelical Christian world. If I had let what I had grown up hearing be my truth, I would not be doing the thing that is most natural for me to be doing. If I had not had an open mind when I came across a more accurate description of philosophy, I would have been letting propagated, uninformed opinions (redundant?) keep me from being me. The Skeptic, though, doesn't just use doubt as a tool. He makes it a way of life.

So how does a Skeptic live this life of epoche, of constant suspension of judgment? We've already demonstrated it--if a thing or idea can be shown to have an equally credible, contradictory thing or idea, then epoche!, both stances are now equally incredible (OP 376). Empiricus unfolds ten ways to find a contradiction, but the long and short of it is to either find a counter-example or show that a thing is only understood within the situation in which it is being evaluated, rendering its objective nature incomprehensible (OP 378-90). Our previous examples will suffice.

All of this sounds very Pragmatic--there is no absolute truth, or at least, if there is, there's no way that we can know we have found it (this statement itself not being absolute [OP 376, cf. William James' Conception of Truth {hereafter CT}]). But upon closer inspection, it can be seen that, while similar, Pragmatism is more effective in stimulating the search for truth, using 'what works,' whereas Skepticism tends to squelch it, more like a quest of doubt resulting in the cessation of intellectual inquiry. The two will be compared and contrasted in light of certain of Pragmatism's categories, or underlying principles.

Before we begin, what does the Pragmatist mean by 'what works'? 'Truth' is what works to satisfy desires (CT). That is a loaded statement that needs a lot of unpacking, which is beyond the scope of this piece, but the summation is if an idea has a practical application for the end which I seek, then that idea is a true one. Let us look at William James's hypothetical example of a man chasing a squirrel around a tree. Both creatures run around the tree in such a way as to never see each other. Does the man run around the squirrel as he runs around the tree? It depends. If you desire the man to have run north, east, south and west of the squirrel, then yes, it works to say he ran around the squirrel. If you desire the man to have run around the head, back, tail and stomach of the squirrel, then no, your desire is not satisfied, for he was always positioned in line with the squirrel’s belly. It doesn't work to say the man ran around the squirrel (What Pragmatism Means [hereafter PM]).

As was previously mentioned, both philosophies hold to the nigh infallibility of fallibilism (we can always be wrong) and, with that, the constant evolution of ideas (I daren't say knowledge), that is, 'truth' has always--and will ever--change (OP 378-9). What we 'know' today is outdated tomorrow, as we've seen in the realm of mathematics, natural science and of technology for the last couple of hundred years, even as recently as yesterday. What we were sure could never happen turns out to be commonplace, or what everyone is so sure to have happened, never actually did (take 'bra burning,' for example [[reference??]]). The difference is in what each philosophy does with both of these concepts. The Pragmatist will use what works while it works, holding on loosely, letting the currently held view of reality be his springboard into better understanding (CT), while the Skeptic, knowing that what he knows isn't really and can't be known, won't use it. He will spend his mental energies finding a way to discredit what is before him, he will catalyze the process of obsolescence without looking for a practical alternative; any alternative theories will be regarded just long enough to be disregarded. He will let appearances, i.e., what he experiences, end deeper inquiry—extinction, versus evolution. We're touching on the idea of radical empiricism, but we will hold off on a full analysis for the time being.


Both philosophies take the social standard into consideration in regards to how they conduct their lives. The Skeptic 'follow[s] a certain rationale that, in accord with appearances, points us towards a life in conformity with the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and with our own particular pathe' (OP 377, emphasis added). The Pragmatist also binds his view of what works within the confines of the society in which he finds himself, that is, his idea of truth must cohere with what is the entire stock of truth held by the society (PM). Pluralism is at work, and not a relativistic 'I decide on my own what works and what doesn't.' Some instances may help. Neither a Skeptic nor a Pragmatist would, in the United States, walk around town in the nude, for that behavior is outside our culture’s standard of acceptable attire (though, if I understand correctly, a Cynic would have no problem with it). The Pragmatist would go one step further than mere conduct with his pluralism and say, e.g., that the world is not flat because science, mathematics and transportation technology have evolved our stock of truth; we know as a first world, at-least-in-theory educated country, that the world is round (though it can work to say, in limited, practical circumstances that the world is flat and not round—a flexibility that Skepticism doesn’t have [it would make no claim either way]).

While pluralism is important, relativity does have its part to play. William James introduces the Fringe in his Streams of Consciousness (hereafter SC). The Fringe is the sum total of all of one's interconnected experiences, mental and physical. I was raised by my family, with their ideals, in California, and I have learned all the things I've learned and have done or have had happen to me all the things that have occurred in my life. No one else can say they have had all the same experiences and thoughts as me, so no one can see the world exactly as I see it. Because I see the world how I see it, what I desire isn’t necessarily what you desire and, with that, what works for me doesn't necessarily work for you. It doesn't work for me to play video games all day, every day; I would spend my life doing something more intellectually or relationally significant. For the guys at my place of employment playing video games works. Empiricus also takes personal perspective into account when he says, 'But in putting forward these [seemingly, but non-dogmatic] slogans [e.g., "Nothing is true"] he is saying what seems to him to be the case and is reporting his pathos without belief, not firmly maintaining anything concerning what exists externally' (OP 376, emphasis added). The Fringe isn't a term he is used to, but it is an idea I think he would be comfortable with, being he takes into account subjective pathe.

An interesting thing to note is that James says that our experience is determined by what we elect to focus on, that is, we select what to notice of all that is going on around us (SC). E.g., being Roman Catholic, I am more apt to notice the bracelet of saints on the wrist of the clerk at the supermarket then a Buddhist would, for such things are relevant to me, but not necessarily for a Buddhist, even though we are both checked out by the same clerk. Empiricus, on the other hand, speaks of 'passively received phantasia [i.e., appearances]' (OP 377), treating experience as something that simply happens to us.

We can see, then, that our Fringe determines the growth of our Fringe, which can only happen if what composes our experiences are real, that is to say, nothing can't influence us, only something can do that, and for me, the experiences I have had are real, shown by the fact that they've really influenced me. This is where radical empiricism comes into play and where Skepticism and Pragmatism really part ways. Pragmatism holds that if something is experience-able it is real, and if it is real it is experience-able (Radical Empiricism). I might not ever know what this honey's flavor is independent of my own tongue, but there is a sweetness my tongue receives, and I'm interested in finding out what makes this honey sweet, even if just to me. It's real enough to stimulate thought and I will use what I have that works to find out ('there is a living spirit of "sweetness" inhabiting this honey') until what works doesn't cut it anymore (cue 'scientific advancement'), then I will find some other 'truth' that will work (a certain chemical compound reacts to certain receptors on a certain part of my tongue, stimulating a certain part of my brain, registering 'sweetness').

The Skeptic:

Those who claim that the Skeptics deny appearances seem to me not to have heard what we say. For...we do not reject the things that lead us involuntarily to assent in accord with a passively received phantasia, and these are appearances. And when we question whether the external object is such as it appears, we grant that it does appear, and we are not raising a question about the appearance but rather about what is said about the appearance… (OP 377)

He is saying, in a sense, that it works to say that what is experienced appears to be real, but there is no license to make the claim that it is, and it has been shown that he will make every effort, through his modes of epoche, to decimate any postulate concerning reality. He will go with the appearance of the sweetness of honey (OP 377), but since it tastes different to him when he is sick or healthy (OP 380), he won't assent to any idea regarding the nature of honey. I admit that he will use his experience for ‘what works’ to a limited, practical degree—he will eat and enjoy the honey. But any deeper investigation into, e.g., what Aristotle would call a thing’s causes (Physics), isn’t allowed even to get started, let alone flourish. 'Yes, it appears that way, but there's no need to go any deeper than the appearance, for we won't ever be able to know even if we tried.' The search stops. And if all attempts to gain a grasp on reality are undercut before one can get a leg up on understanding the nature of things, before any more-than-day-to-day practical advancement can be made, in an endless cycle of contradiction, what is left for one to do but to simply 'hold to appearances, then,...[and]...live without beliefs...in accord with the ordinary regimen of life [thinking, sensing, eating, following customs and taking up a craft], since we cannot be wholly inactive’ (OP 377, emphasis added, for that word implies the resignation to a life mostly inactive). It is reminiscent of Descartes who, playing the Skeptic, despite the fact that all the world may be maliciously contrived illusion, still got dressed and put logs on the fire, since it appeared necessary if he were to survive long enough to make his inquiry concerning the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, but who also, pragmatically, used what worked so as to progress deeper into said inquiry (Meditations on First Philosophy).

I can hear Empiricus now: 'Be a Skeptic—you'll never give yourself a chance to really live through philosophic and scientific exploration since you'll be spending all of your energy in both contradicting any and every idea that comes your way and in mere physical survival, but you will be able to just get through life without any satisfaction!'

While the Skeptic claims to be on the search for truth, what he is really doing boils down to being contrary toward all declarative and interrogative thought, putting an abrupt halt on all metaphysical and intellectual pursuit. A much more effective approach to epistemology is to do like the Pragmatist--use what works until it doesn't, then evolve.

[[Unrelated topic—I was curious as to whether or not our word ‘empirical’ comes from Sextus Empiricus, for his stance is quite empirical, so I did a little etymological research. It turns out that ‘Empirical derives from the Latin empiricus, which is a transliteration of the Greek empiricos (empirical, experienced; εμπειρικός) from empiria (experience; εμπειρία) from en- (in, with) + pira (experience, trial; πείρα), from the verb pirao (make an attempt, try, test, get experience, endeavour, attack; πειράω)’ (English words of no apparent Greek origin).

So it seems that Empiricus is more a title or description, and not a proper name. The question then remains, did he or his contemporaries dub him such, or was that a description that later, Latin-based students of philosophy eventually coupled to ‘Sextus’?]]

Works Cited

Adler, Mortimer J. Van Doren, Charles. How to read a book: The classic guide to intelligent
reading (1972, 2 ed). New York. Simon & Schuster.

Aristotle. Physics. Translated by R.P. Hardie & P.K. Gaye by permission of Oxford University Press, edited by Louis P. Pojman (1998). Classics of philosophy (2 ed). New York. Oxford University Press.

Descartes, Renee. Meditations on first philosophy. No translator given. 2009. New York.
Classic Books America.

James, William. ‘Conceptions of truth’ edited by Giles Gunn in Pragmatism and other writings.
2000. New York. Penguin Books 2000.

James, William. Essays in radical empiricism and a pluralistic universe. 1967. Gloucester,
MA. Peter Smith Pub Inc.

James, William. ‘Streams of consciousness’ edited by Giles Gunn in Pragmatism and other
writings. 2000. New York. Penguin Books 2000.

James, William. ‘What pragmatism means’ edited by Giles Gunn in Pragmatism and other
writings. 2000. New York. Penguin Books 2000.

English words of no apparent Greek origin. ‘Etymology of empirical-empiric.’ 
http://ewonago.blogspot.com/2009/02/etymology-of-empirical-empiric.html

Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of pyrrhonism. Translated by Benson Mates (1996) by permission of Oxford University Press, edited by Louis P. Pojman (1998). Classics of philosophy (2 ed). New York. Oxford University Press.